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Michael Tooley has developed important and sophisticated evidential versions of the argument
from evil that aim to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil de-
pend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally
sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient
reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley’s defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that
the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence
of unknown wrongmaking properties. I argue that Tooley’s arguments beg the question against
the theist, and, in doing so, commit an analogue of the base rate fallacy. I conclude with some
reflections on what a successful argument from evil would have to establish.
The Problem of Evil
Many people have the intuition that the existence ofGod is incompatible with the exis-
tence of evil, or with the existence of particular appalling evils, or that the existence of
evil or particular appalling evils make it very unlikely that God exists. However, con-
verting this intuition – one which, after all, isn’t shared by all or even most people –
into a successful argument against the existence of God has proven difficult. Few now
hold that there are convincing deductive arguments from premises about the nature
of God and uncontroversial premises about the existence of evil which show that the
existence of God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil.1 Instead, a variety
of evidential arguments from evil have been proposed. Undergirding evidential argu-
ments from evil is the idea that the existence of evil (or terrible evil, or some particular
evils) show that theism is unlikely, and hence defeats entitlement to theism.2
1See Mackie (1955) for a classic statement of this kind of argument.
2See (e.g.) (Rowe 1979; 1991; 1996; 1998) for classic statements of inductive arguments from evil,
Draper (1989) for a Bayesian formulation, and Tooley (2015) for some recent objections to these.
1
2Michael Tooley (Plantinga and Tooley (2008), Tooley (2012)) has developed a so-
phisticated and rigorous evidential argument from evil, immune to objections often
levelled against other arguments from evil. This makes understanding the argument
a particularly important task. Despite this, it has so far received relatively little atten-
tion in the literature.3 Tooley’s own argument is concrete, inductive and deontological.
That is to say, it argues from particular actual evils rather than the presence of evil
(of a kind of evil, or an amount of evil) more generally; it argues that the existence
of God is improbable given these evils, and not that it is logically incompatible with
these evils; and it focusses on the rightness of wrongness of acts rather than on the
goodness or badness of states of affairs. In fact, Tooley gives two arguments. The first
takes a single concrete evil – the Lisbon Earthquake – and argues that it is more likely
than not that God did not exist at the start of the Lisbon Earthquake. The second
makes a cumulative case from many concrete evils, and argues that the existence of
God is very unlikely indeed. I’ll be focussing on Tooley’s stronger, second argument
(though what I say applies, in slightly modified form, to the first) but it will be useful
to look briefly at the first to get a sense of his general strategy. Tooley’s arguments, I
will argue, beg the question against the theist, and so, even if sound, cannot provide
warrant for the conclusion that God does not exist.
Tooley’s First Argument
Before we can get a grip on Tooley’s arguments, we will need to set out some of his
terminology. Key here is the idea of rightmaking and wrongmaking properties. An
action which has only rightmaking properties is morally permissible or obligatory,
and an action which has only wrongmaking properties is morally impermissible. An
action can possess wrongmaking properties, but still be morally right (permissible or
obligatory) overall, so long as its rightmaking properties outweigh its wrongmaking
properties. Similarly, an action can possess rightmaking properties but still bemorally
wrong (impermissible) overall, so long as its wrongmaking properties outweigh its
rightmaking properties. To account for this, rightmaking and wrongmaking prop-
erties, as Tooley understands them, are also quantitative ‘so that there are numbers
associated with rightmaking and wrongmaking properties that represent the moral
weight, or seriousness, of the properties in question.’ (Plantinga and Tooley (2008,
116)) Tooley takes this to be necessary if acts with both rightmaking and wrongmak-
ing properties are to have a determinatemoral status.4 Thenext step is to note that, for
3See Alvin Plantinga’s contribution to Plantinga and Tooley (2008), Otte (2013), and Langtry (2015)
for discussion of the argument.
4This isn’t quite right. It could be the case that some moral reasons can trump others without it
being the case that they have numerically describable values which can be added to one another. Moral
reasoning could be nonmonotonic without being quantitative. In which case, actions could have both
3any act, we can subdivide right- and wrongmaking properties of that act into those of
which we have knowledge and those of which we do not. An action then is prima facie
wrong ‘if the weight of its known wongmaking properties, taken together, is greater
than the weight of its known rightmaking properties, taken together.’ (Plantinga and
Tooley (2008, 116)) Tooley treats permitting events to occur, that are within one’s
power to prevent, as an action. The action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur
has the wrongmaking property of allowing more than 50,000 ordinary people to be
killed. Keeping these points in mind, we can set out Tooley’s first argument.5 Tooley
wants to justify the inductive step from p to q:
p: The action of intentionally allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur has
a wrongmaking property that we know of, and there are no rightmaking
properties known to be counterbalancing.
q: The total wrongmaking properties of the action of intentionally al-
lowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur outweigh the total rightmaking
properties of that action—including rightmaking properties of which we
have no knowledge.
Tooley then provides his attempted justification of this step. Central to Tooley’s
justification is a symmetry principlewith respect to unknown rightmaking and wrong-
making properties:
Given what we know about rightmaking and wrongmaking properties in
themselves, for any two numbers, M andN, the probability of there being
an unknown rightmaking property with a moral weight between M and
N is equal to the probability of there being an unknown wrongmaking
property with a (negative) moral weight whose absolute value is between
M and N. (Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 129))
In other words, there may be unknown rightmaking properties that attach to acts
that are prima faciewrong, but it is just as likely that there are unknown wrongmaking
properties that attach to these acts, and, moreover, these rightmaking properties are
not more likely to be weightier than these wrongmaking properties (or vice versa).
rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, whilst still being determinately right, or wrong, even if right-
making and wrongmaking properties are not quantitative. Langtry (2015) makes the point that some
wrongmaking properties could be defeated by properties which were not themselves rightmaking prop-
erties. I will ignore these complications; my objection here does not depend on whether Tooley’s argu-
ment could be reformulated to take account of them.
5In fact, Tooley’s first argument is set out in more than twenty steps. What I provide here is a sketch,
though one that keeps the main joints of the argument clearly in view.
4Unknown deontological properties need not pull in the theist’s favour, and are just as
likely to pull away from it. This is a crucial step in providing a rejoinder to the scep-
tical theist. Sceptical theists argue that our cognitive limitations are such that we are
not in a position to rule out (in Tooley’s terminology) unknown rightmaking proper-
ties for events that it would be prima facie wrong to permit – rightmaking properties
sufficiently weighty to make to make the event overall right to permit.6 For instance,
though permitting the Lisbon earthquake had the wrongmaking property of allowing
over 50,000 ordinary people to be killed, perhaps there are unknown countervailing
rightmaking properties attached to permitting the Lisbon earthquake, which would
outweigh this and other known wrongmaking properties. Tooley’s point here is that
this may well be true, but lopsided. Our cognitive limitations are also such that we are
not in a position to rule out unknownwrongmaking properties for events that it would
be prima facie wrong to permit – wrongmaking properties that add further weight
against the permissibility of the prima facie wrong event. Why think that something
like the symmetry principle holds? Tooley argues for the symmetry principle on the
basis of three considerations:
1. Judged from a purely a priori point of view, the mere existence of wrongmaking
properties is no less likely than the existence of rightmaking properties.
2. Judged from a purely a priori point of view, the likelihood that there exists a
rightmaking property with amoral weight whose absolute value is equal toM is
no greater than the likelihood that there exists a wrongmaking property whose
absolute value is equal to M.
3. Judged from a purely a priori point of view, the likelihood that there is a right-
making property with a moral weight whose absolute value is equal to M that is
relevant to the moral status of the action in question, given the knowledge and
power of the agent, is no greater than the likelihood that there is a wrongmaking
property whose absolute value is equal to M that is relevant to the moral status
of the action. (Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 127–8))
Roughly speaking, our a priori grasp of rightmaking andwrongmaking properties
is such that there are no a priori reasons to take there to be more rightmaking prop-
erties than wrongmaking properties (or vice versa), to take it to be more likely than
not that rightmaking properties are weightier than wrongmaking properties (or vice
versa), or to take it to be more likely than not that relevant rightmaking properties are
weightier than relevant wrongmaking properties (or vice versa). 1–3 underwrite the
symmetry principle with respect to unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking prop-
erties, which in turn underwrites the symmetry principle (C1):
6See Wykestra (1984) and Alston (1991) for representative early statements of this idea.
5(C1) If A is an action that, judged by known rightmaking andwrongmak-
ing properties, is prima facie very seriously wrong, then the probability
that action A is morally wrong, all relevant rightmaking and wrongmak-
ing properties considered, both known and unknown, is greater than one
half. (Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 130))
(C1) is then applied to justify the inductive step from p to q. As noted above,
Tooley’s argument is concrete, appealing to actual, specific evils, and, in particular,
the Lisbon earthquake. Substituting A for ‘the Lisbon Earthquake’ in (C1), we can
combine it with the premise:
Permitting the the Lisbon Earthquake is an action that, judged by known
rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, is prima facie very seriously
wrong.
to get:
The probability that permitting the Lisbon Earthquake is morally wrong,
all relevant rightmaking and wrongmaking properties considered, both
known and unknown, is greater than one half.
From here it’s very easy to see how the rest of the argument goes, for amorally per-
fect being, with knowledge of all rightmaking and wrongmaking properties and the
power to prevent the Lisbon earthquake, would not permit the Lisbon earthquake if
doing so is was morally wrong, all things considered. Since the Lisbon earthquake in
fact took place, if permitting the Lisbon earthquake is morally wrong, all things con-
sidered, then a morally perfect being, with knowledge of all rightmaking and wrong-
making properties and the power to prevent the Lisbon earthquake, did not exist at
the time of the Lisbon earthquake. And if the probability that permitting the Lis-
bon Earthquake is morally wrong, all things considered, is greater than one half, then
the probability that a morally perfect being, with knowledge of all rightmaking and
wrongmaking properties and the power to prevent the Lisbon earthquake, did not
exist at the time of the Lisbon earthquake, is greater than one half. Assuming that a
being like this did not come into existence since the Lisbon earthquake, then no such
being exists.
Tooley’s Second Argument
The first argument aims to show only that, given the Lisbon Earthquake, it is more
likely thannot thatGoddoesn’t exist. But Tooley thinks there is a stronger argument to
be had: that multiple prima facie seriously wrong evils have a cumulative impact. The
6second argument makes use of three key bits of conceptual machinery, due to Carnap
(1962): state-descriptions, structure-descriptions, and predicates that aremaximalwith
respect to a set of properties.
Before we turn to more of the details however, it’s worth characterising, in an in-
tuitive way, the idea behind this argument. For brevity, we will refer to events such
that, judged by known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties alone, it would be
wrong for God to permit, as prima facie wrong events. Similarly, we will refer to events
such that, judged by both known and unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking prop-
erties, it would be permissible for God to permit, and permissible events. Say there
are n prima facie wrong events in our world, and k unknown right- and wrongmaking
properties. Take all the possible worlds where those n events obtain and where these
k properties might be instantiated. Only a subset of those worlds will be such that
all the n prima facie wrong events are in fact permissible. In this subset of worlds,
the unknown right- and wrongmaking properties are always such that they tip the
balance in favour of events being permissible (by God); viz. the total rightmaking
properties associated with permitting any given event to take place always outweigh
the total wrongmaking properties associated with permitting that event to take place.
Moreover, if we assume that unknown right- and wrongmaking properties are evenly
distributed across worlds (as Tooley’s considerations 1–3 suggest), then the larger n is
– the more prima facie wrong events there are – the smaller the proportion of worlds
in which all these events are in fact permissible. The probability that our world is
permissible is given by the ratio of permissible worlds to the total number of worlds;
the proportion of worlds which are permissible. If one in ten worlds, for example, are
permissible, then there is a 0.1 probability that the actual world is permissible.
With this intuitive characterisation in hand, we can turn to somedetails of Tooley’s
argument, and firstly to the idea of a state description (Carnap (1962)). Given a first-
order language Lwith logical expressions ‘&’ and ‘¬’, unitary predicate symbols ‘P’, ‘Q’,
‘R’ etc., and constants ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, etc., a state description is a sentence of L that assigns
every predicate or its negation to every constant. Putting this more intuitively, though
in a more metaphysically loaded way, given a set of individuals and a set of properties,
a state-description is a proposition that specifies for each individual whether it has
each property. In other words, a state-description characterises a possible world; it is
a description, within a language, of a possible world.
Importantly for Tooley’s argument, the number of unique state descriptions in a
language L depends on the the number of predicate symbols and constants in L. If L
contains one predicate ‘P’ and one constant ‘a’, then L produces two state descriptions:
Pa
¬Pa
7If L contains one predicate ‘P’ and two constants ‘a’ and ‘b’, then L produces four
state descriptions:
Pa & Pb
¬Pa & Pb
Pa & ¬Pb
¬Pa & ¬Pb
Similarly, if L contains one predicate ‘P’ and three constants, ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’, then L
produces eight state descriptions:
Pa & Pb & Pc
Pa & Pb & ¬Pc
Pa & ¬Pb & Pc
¬Pa & Pb & Pc
Pa & ¬Pb & ¬Pc
¬Pa & ¬Pb & Pc
¬Pa & Pb & ¬Pc
¬Pa & ¬Pb & ¬Pc
This is crucial, because being able to count state descriptions is what makes it pos-
sible to provide the ratio of permissible worlds to the total number of worlds, and
hence the proportion of worlds which are permissible, and hence the probability that
our world is permissible. Each state description has a probabilistic weight (possibly
all the same), and the probability of a statement is the sum of the weights of the state
descriptions it is true in. Take L to contain one predicate ‘P’ and three constants, ‘a’,
‘b’, and ‘c’, and give each state description an equal weight. Then, since Pa is true in
half of the state descriptions p(Pa) = 0.5. Since, ‘Pa & Pb & Pc’ is only true in one
state description, p(Pa & Pb & Pc) = 1/8 = 0.125. For reasons to do with induction,
Tooley doesn’t assign equal weight to state descriptions, but to structure descriptions.
Structure descriptions provide structural information about how many objects have
each given property.7 Two state descriptions have the same structure description if
they are isomorphic. Let the structure description of a sentence  be designated [].
Then, for instance, [Pa & Pb & ¬Pc] = [Pa & ¬Pb & Pc] = [¬Pa & Pb & Pc] since each
7Take the eight state descriptions in the last example above. Carnap wants to make it the case that
if we learn (e.g.) that Pa and that Pb, this increases the probability that Pc. However, if we assign equal
probabilisticweight to all state descriptions, then the two remaining state descriptions (‘Pa&Pb&Pc’ and
‘Pa & Pb & ¬Pc’) are both equally likely. Assigning equal probabilistic weight to structure descriptions
means that learning that Pa and that Pb doesmake Pc more likely. (Note this gives the odd result that it
is inherently more likely that all the objects in a world will have a given property than that some of them
will; e.g. it is inherently more likely that Pa & Pb & Pc than that Pa & ¬Pb & Pc.)
8of these state descriptions characterises two objects as having P, and [Pa & ¬Pb& ¬Pc]
= [¬Pa & ¬Pb & Pc] = [¬Pa & Pb& ¬Pc], since each of these state descriptions charac-
terises one object as having P. Tooley’s argument now involves finding a way to count
the total number of relevant structure descriptions. This will give us the total num-
ber of relevant possible world-structures. Then we will need to find a way to count
the number of structure descriptions in which all the prima facie wrong events are in
fact permissible. Given this, we can calculate the ratio of permissible world-structures
to world-structures in total, which will allow us to say how likely it is that the actual
world is a permissible world.
What structure descriptions are relevant? What features will L have? We are not
interested here in every metaphysically possible world. What we are considering are
all the possible worlds that contain all the actual-world prima facie wrong events. So
Lwill contain a one constant for every prima facie wrong event that has taken place in
the actual world. Call the number of prima facie wrong events n. The total number of
structure descriptionswill depend on the size of n. But to calculate both the total num-
ber of structure descriptions and the number of permissible structure descriptions we
will also have to know more about the predicates of L.
Predicates in the language used to characterise structure descriptions can be deon-
tological. In other words, structure descriptions can attribute rightmaking properties
and wrongmaking properties to events, and hence can characterise possible worlds
as being either permissible or impermissible, in the sense that it is either permissible
or impermissible for God to allow that possible world to be actualised. A structure
description is prima facie impermissible if at least one of the events in it is prima facie
wrong for God to allow. And a structure description is in fact permissible if none of
the events are morally wrong (for God to allow) once all the right- and wrongmaking
properties, both known and unknown, are taken into account. As such, structure de-
scriptions that are prima facie impermissible cannot be in fact permissible unless there
are unknown rightmaking properties strong enough to counterbalance the wrong-
making properties, both known and unknown. What Tooley is interested in here is
the set of structure descriptions that contain all the prima facie impermissible events
contained in the actual world. (The actual world is after all, according to Tooley, one
that is characterised as prima facie impermissible, due to it containing events that are
prima facie impermissible. The Lisbon earthquake is an example of one such event,
but Tooley thinks that there are a great many such cases, including the ageing and
death of human beings.)8 The probability that our world is in fact permissible, all
things considered, can be found if we compare the total number of structure descrip-
8‘[E]veryone undergoes the evil of death, and a high proportion of people undergo the evil of aging,
and given the rightmaking and wrongmaking properties of which we are aware, allowing either is surely
unjustified, except in a small proportion of cases.’ (Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 142))
9tions that contain all the prima facie impermissible events contained in the actual
world with the number of all-things-considered-permissible structure descriptions
that contain all the prima facie impermissible events contained in the actual world.
The probability that our world is permissible is given by the ratio of permissible struc-
ture descriptions of this sort to the total number of structure descriptions of this sort;
the proportion of structure descriptions of this sort which are permissible.
To calculate this, Tooleymakes use of an ingenious idea due to Carnap. Call predi-
cates that aremaximalwith respect to unknown rightmaking andwrongmaking prop-
erties – i.e. that, for any given action and all rightmaking andwrongmaking properties,
attribute to that action either those properties or their negations – Q-predicates. Let
U be the set of all unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties.We can then
say:
• A Q-predicate P is positive iff considering only the properties in U, any action
to which P applies is neither morally neutral or morally impermissible.
• A Q-predicate P is negative iff considering only the properties in U, any action
to which P applies is morally impermissible.
• A Q-predicate P is neutral iff considering only the properties in U, any action
to which P applies is morally neutral.
Let us say that P will justify a prima facie wrong action a if and only if P is a Q-
predicate that applies to a and is sufficiently weighty to counterbalance the extent to
which a is prima facie wrong, given the known wrongmaking and rightmaking prop-
erties that apply to a. Clearly then, only positive Q-predicates are such that they can
justify prima facie wrong actions. However, not all positive Q-predicates will justify
some prima facie wrong action, since (given Tooley’s assumptions about rightmak-
ing and wrongmaking properties) not all Q-predicates will be sufficiently weighty to
counterbalance the extent to which that action is prima facie wrong. So the predicates
that justify a given action will usually be a proper subset of the positive predicates.
Calculating the relative cardinalities of the set of justifying Q-predicates and this sub-
set would be difficult. But we can ignore this complication if we aim to calculate an
upper bound on the probability that unknown rightmaking properties are sufficient
to counterbalance the prima facie wrongness of the prima facie wrong events we are
considering. To do that we need to consider the total number of structure descrip-
tions versus the number of structure descriptions in which every action is assigned a
positive Q-predicate.
Because we’re talking about maximal predicates (predicates that are exhaustive
with respect to unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties), each prima fa-
cie impermissible action (i.e. each constant of L) gets “paired” with exactly one Q-
predicate in U – each Q-predicate in U gets attributed to exactly one action. So the
10
task is equivalent to finding out how many ways there are to pair a given number of
predicates with a given number of constants. Appealing to maximal predicates, then,
turns this into a combinatorics problem. Quite generally, the number of sets of n
objects that can be chosen from N objects is equal to
N!
n!(N   n)!
Carnap (1962, 159–60) shows that if there are m maximal predicates, then the
number of structures descriptions is equal to the number of ways of choosing (m  1)
things from a set of (n+ m   1) things. Plugging these values into n and N then, the
total number of structure descriptions is equal to
(n+ m   1)!
((n+ m   1)   (m   1))!(m   1)!
which can be written as
(n+ m   1)!
n!(m   1)!
Take the set of all Q-predicates of actions. The cardinality of this set must be a
power of 2, because, given Tooley’s symmetry considerations, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between negative predicates, on the one hand, and positive predi-
cates, on the other hand. Because of this, we can call the number of Q-predicates 2k,
and we can divide the set of Q-predicates into two other sets, S and T of cardinality k,
such that all the positive Q-predicates and some neutral Q-predicates are in S , while
all the negative Q-predicates and the remaining neutral Q-predicates are in T . Recall
that formmaximal predicates and n singular terms, the total number of structures de-
scriptions is equal to (n+m 1)!n!(m 1)! . It follows that total number of structure descriptions
ascribing Q-predicates (i.e. Q-predicates from S [ T ) to actions is equal to
(n+ 2k   1)!
n!(2k   1)!
and the number of structure descriptions assigning Q-predicates from S is equal
to
(n+ k   1)!
n!(k   1)!
Use P(k,n) to designate the upper bound on the probability that none of the n
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prima facie evils is wrong in fact wrong. P(k,n) is the ratio of total relevant structure
descriptions to permissible ones. This is given by dividing the latter equation by the
former. Tooley shows that this is equal to:
P(k; n) =
(2k   1)(2k   2)…(k + 1)(k)
(n+ 2k   1)(n+ 2k   2)…(n+ k)
It can be shown that:
1. P(k; n) is a monotonically decreasing function of n.
2. P(k; n; ) is a monotonically decreasing function of k, except where n = 1, when
the value of P(k; n) is the same for all values of k.
2 shows us that for any n, P(k; n) is a maximum when k = 1. So this gives us the
all important upper bound on P(k; n):
1
n+ 1
Now, given that n = the number of prima facie impermissible events in the world,
then the upper bound on the probability that these are all permissible is very low. For
instance, Tooley takes death to be prima facie impermissible. It’s estimated that there
are around 100,000,000,000 human beings who have ever been born. Since (presum-
ably) all of these people have or will die, the upper bound on the probability that God
exists, given human death, is around 1100;000;000;001 .
Problems With The Argument
Though Tooley’s is an important and potentially powerful version of the argument
from evil, I have already noted that there is relatively little by way of response to it.
RichardOtte (2013) objects that, by weighing structure descriptions equally, the argu-
ment implausibly relies on the idea that possible rightmaking properties for any given
prima facie wrong event are independent of one another. Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga
and Tooley (2008)) argues that the symmetry principle explicitly at play in Tooley’s
first argument is not something we can know to hold (though doesn’t provide much
in the way of motivation for this). Bruce Langtry (2015) raises a number of diffi-
culties in formulating Tooley’s argument, including objections to Tooley’s account of
properties,9 and points out that (though he address the issue to some extent in Too-
ley (2015)) the possibility of a successful theodicy is largely set aside in Plantinga and
9In particular, if Tooley adopts a liberal conception of properties, then there will be infinitely many
unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, with the result that P(k,n) would involve dividing
infinity by infinity. If, on the other hand, Tooley adopts a sparse conception of properties, he is faced
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Tooley (2008) and Tooley (2012). However, even if Tooley could reformulate his ar-
gument to remove the idealising assumption that the possible rightmaking properties
for any given prima facie wrong event are independent of one another, and provide an
account of properties that addresses Langtry’s objections, there remains an evenmore
serious, and revealing, objection to Tooley’s formulation of the argument from evil.
In treating each structure description as equally probable, Tooley begs the ques-
tion against the theist, and, in doing so, commits something akin to a base rate fallacy.
Here is an example of the latter:
You have discovered some strange symptoms; your tongue is covered
in blue spots. You visit your doctor who tells you that these symptoms
are associated with a rare disease that afflicts 1 in every 100,000 people.
Worse, the symptoms are very closely associated with a disease: in only
5% of cases in which someone does not have the disease will they mani-
fest blue spots on their tongue. Yet worse still, in every case of the disease,
the afflicted person will manifest the blue spots.
Given this, what is the likelihood that you have the disease? There is a strong
intuitive pull to say that the likelihood is around, or even greater than 0.95. We tend
to reason in the following sort of way: the symptom is only misleading in 5% of cases,
so there is a 95% chance the symptom is not misleading; in which case, there is a
0.95 probability I have the disease. Despite this intuitive pull, the reasoning here is
fallacious. In fact the probability you have the disease is around 0.0002 (i.e. 0.02% or
2% of 1%.). How so? It isn’t difficult to see where the reasoning goes wrong. 1 in
100,000 people have the disease. Out of a set of 100,000 people, one person will have
the disease and correctly be diagnosedwith the disease on the basis of their symptoms.
Because there are false positives in 5% of healthy people with the symptoms, out of the
remaining healthy 99,999, there will be almost 5000 (4999.95) false positive results;
i.e. almost 5000 healthy people with the symptoms. For every 5000.95 people with
blue spots on their tongues only 1 will have the disease. Of those with blue spots on
their tongues, the ratio of healthy to afflicted is 4999.95:1. Given your symptoms then
there is only around a 1 in 5000 chance that you have the disease. This is captured in
Bayes’ Theorem:
p(HjE) = p(EjH)p(H)
p(E)
with the task of explaining how the properties Tooley appeals to (such as Choosing not to prevent the
death of over 50,000 people) is grounded in a sparse set of morally relevant properties.
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where ‘H’ and ‘E’ stand for hypothesis and evidence respectively, and, for any sen-
tencesX andY, pp(X|Y)qmeans ‘the probability of X given Y’. In our case the hypoth-
esis is that you are ill, and the evidence is your symptoms. Bayes’Theoremmakes clear
that the likelihood of being ill is a function of (amongst other things) the base rate of
ill people p(H). The lower the prior probability of having the disease, the lower the
conditional probability that you have the disease given that you have the symptoms,
and in this case the prior probability of having the disease is very low indeed. In taking
the posterior probability that you have the disease to be around 0.95, one is treating
the prior probability of having the disease as being equally weighted with the prior
probability of not having the disease. We can press this idea further. Imagine that a
revolutionary therapy a generation ago wiped out the disease so that no-one can be
infected. It is still the case that the blue spots on your tongue are, in a real sense, an
indicator of the disease. In every possible case of the disease, the afflicted person will
have these symptoms, and only in a small proportion of possible cases will someone
manifest the symptoms without having the disease. However, not only is the environ-
ment that you happen to be in not one in which this indicator functions reliably, it is
an environment in which the indicator never produces the correct result.
Tooley has not argued for any logical or metaphysical incompatibility between the
existence of God and the existence of prima facie impermissible events. In fact, Tooley
affirms the logical or metaphysical possibility that there are good reasons for God to
permit the prima facie evils of our world:
[I]f it is logically possible that a single, unimpressive evil might be logi-
cally necessary for some greater good, must this not also be possible in
the case of a horrendous evil? But, then, if this is possible in the case of a
single, horrendous evil, how could it not be so in the case of a multitude
of horrendous evils? … As a consequence, it seems to me that the argu-
ment from evil needs to be formulated in a different way—namely, not as
a deductive argument for a very strong claim, such as that it is logically
impossible for both God and evil to exist, or for both God and a certain
quantity of evil, or certain types of evil, to exist, but as an inductive (or ev-
idential or probabilistic) argument for the more modest claim that there
are evils that actually exist in the world that make it unlikely—indeed,
very unlikely—that God exists. Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 100)
There are, according to Tooley’s account, possible world-structures (structure de-
scriptions) in which there aremany prima faciewrong events and in whichGod exists.
Instead, Tooley has argued that, out of the totality of possible world-structures (struc-
ture descriptions), only a relatively small proportion are ones in which there are many
prima facie wrong events and God exists. Each state description provides one possi-
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ble permutation of howmaximal unknown rightmaking andwrongmaking predicates
can be assigned to constants denoting prima facie wrong events. Every possible way
of attaching predicates to constants is accounted for in the set of state descriptions.
Equal probabilistic weight is then assigned to each set of structurally identical permu-
tations. The probability that our world is permissible is given by the proportion of sets
of structurally identical permutations that characterise permissible worlds. What we
have then is the probability that all prima facie wrong events are in fact permissible,
if unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties have been assigned to them
randomly. But, having made this explicit, the fundamental problem with Tooley’s
argument should be clear. The idea that unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking
properties are assigned to events randomly, or as good as randomly, is something that
can only be held if one has already rejected theism.
Theists hold that, out of all the conceptually possible worlds, only a small subset
are such that God would actualise them or permit their existence. This is the gist of
any notion of divine providence. If God exists, a divine filtering process is going on.
ThoughGod has permittedmany evils, Godmay very well have preventedmanymore
from taking place. In particular, out of all the possible prima facie wrong events, God
has only permitted those prima facie wrong events which are in fact permissible. It
may of course be that, out of all the conceptually possible worlds, a higher propor-
tion containing prima facie impermissible events are not permissible, but this is nei-
ther here nor there. Given theism, and divine providence, the only possible world-
structures (relevant structure descriptions) are those that are all things considered
permissible: other world-structures are not compossible with the existence of God.
In treating the possibility space as including all structure descriptions, and weighing
these equally, Tooley begs the question against the theist.
In fact, what Tooley has shown at most is that if God does not exist – if no filtering
is going on – it is very improbable that the evils we see in our world are such that a
morally perfect God would allow them. If God does exist, filtering is taking place, and
Tooley’s base of total structure descriptions is too large. If we are unsure whether God
exists, then the total number of structure descriptions is something on which we have
to remain agnostic. Tooley’s argument may be sound, but, as Tooley’s assumptions
about the total number of structure descriptions are only warranted if one already
possesses warrant for atheism, it fails to transmit warrant. We can see this in the
analogous case of the diagnostic test. The analogue of theists, in this case, are those
who hold that the disease has been eradicated. Although blue spots on the tongue are
an indicator of the disease in some sense, those who hold that the disease has been
eradicated are entitled (and in fact obliged) to hold that all cases of blue tongues are
false positives. Weighing known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties acts as
something like a wrongness indicator. Even in an environment under the providential
guidance of amorally perfect and omnipotentGod, some eventswill register positively
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as being wrong. The problem is that we are not in a position to assess how many of
these instances are likely to be false positives (and this could be every case) until we
have settled what environment we are in.
It should be clear that the foregoing can be applied mutatis mutandis to Tooley’s
first argument, in particular his symmetry principle:
(C1) If A is an action that, judged by known rightmaking andwrongmak-
ing properties, is prima facie very seriously wrong, then the probability
that action A is morally wrong, all relevant rightmaking and wrongmak-
ing properties considered, both known and unknown, is greater than one
half. (Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 130))
(C1) may well be true given atheism, for given atheism there is no reason to think
that the events that unfold are, in any way, selected for, or under some kind of provi-
dential guidance. Given atheism, there is no reason to think that an event that seems
impermissible should be permissible all things considered. However, given theism,
the events that unfold are selected for, or under some kind of providential guidance.
Given theism, the only events that are permitted to take place are those that are per-
missible, all things considered. (C1) may be plausible given atheism, but it is false
given theism. Remaining agnostic between atheism and theism requires remaining
agnostic on (C1). On any of these options, the argument fails to transmit warrant.
Retooling Tooley’s Argument
The foregoing suggests a more general issue concerning how to formulate the argu-
ment from evil. For if the argument leaves open the possibility that all prima facie im-
permissible events are all-things-considered permissible, then the theist – who holds
that God filters out any all-things-considered-impermissible events – is entitled (and
in fact obliged) to hold that all prima facie impermissible events are actually all-things-
considered permissible. It is only probable that some of these prima facie impermis-
sible events are actually all-things-considered impermissible if God does not exist.
Absent non-question-begging reasons to think any one of these events is actually all-
things-considered impermissible, this move is always open to the theist.10 Tooley
wants an argument from evil that can affirm two things:
(1)  [The prima facie impermissible events in our world are in fact all-
things-considered permissible].
10I assume here that the theist has entitlement to their theism, prior to hearing the argument from
evil. The argument from evil, after all, is supposed to defeat entitlement to theism.
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(2) It is (highly) probable that [The prima facie impermissible events in
our world are not all-things-considered permissible].
However, in virtue of granting 1, the theist is entitled to deny 2. Given that there is
no metaphysical incompatibility between the existence of God and these prima facie
evils, and given that God has ordained which prima facie evils may take place, 2 is
defeated. There appear then to be quite general reasons then why an argument from
evil that holds 1 and seeks to establish 2 will not in fact transmit warrant to 2. Does
this mean that there could be no successful argument from evil? Not quite, for the
option is still open to attempt to establish a different kind of claim:
(1*) It is (highly) probable that [: [The prima facie impermissible events
in our world are in fact all-things-considered permissible]].
Instead of trying to argue that it is possible but improbable that God has good
reasons for permitting the prima facie evils of our world, one could attempt to argue
that it is unlikely that it is possible that God has good reasons for permitting the prima
facie evils of ourworld. To do that however, onewould be required to defend (i.e. show
to be probable) a substantive moral theory that entailed that some actual prima facie
evils would not be permissible by God under any circumstances whatsoever. Having
such a moral theory in hand would allow for a formulation of the argument from evil
that takes the following sort of shape:
1. There are no circumstances whatsoever under which it would be permissible
for a morally perfect and omnipotent being to allow X.
2. If there are no circumstances whatsoever under which it would be permissible
for a morally perfect and omnipotent being to allow X then, if X took place, no
morally perfect and omnipotent being existed when X took place.
3. If X took place, no morally perfect and omnipotent being existed when X took
place. (1,2 MP)
4. X took place.
5. No morally perfect and omnipotent being existed when X took place. (3,4,MP)
Tooley himself reflects on arguments of this kind:
I do not think that one can establish, without appealing to some substan-
tive, and probably controversial, moral theory, that there cannot be cases
where some evil is logically necessary for a greater good that outweighs
it. (Plantinga and Tooley (2008, 100))
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However, he finds this problematic, because, as we saw above, he takes it that he
is obliged to accept 1 – that it is possible that there are morally sufficient reasons for
God to permit all the evils in our world – and, presumably, because an argument from
evil that relied on a substantive moral theory would always be vulnerable to criticisms
of that moral theory. The argument from evil should, by Tooley’s lights, be something
that does not rely on substantive (and hence contestable)moral premises. But perhaps
this is precisely what the argument from evil cannot be.
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